Stream: git-wasmtime

Topic: wasmtime / issue #14336 RUSTSEC-2026-0285: TLS 1.3 handsh...

Wasmtime GitHub notifications bot (Sep 15 2026 at 00:15):

github-actions[bot] opened issue #14336:

TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries

Details
Package	rustls
Version	0.23.37
URL	https://github.com/rustls/rustls/security/advisories/GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc
Date	2026-09-14
Patched versions	>=0.23.45
Unaffected versions	<0.23.13

Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
a plaintext EncryptedExtensions message packed into the same record as the
ServerHello was accepted.

RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes,
and that implementations terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message"
alert if they do.

The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker
cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that
a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext
without rustls rejecting the connection.

This is functionally the same bug as Go's
GO-2026-4340 (CVE-2025-61730).

See advisory page for additional details.

Wasmtime GitHub notifications bot (Sep 15 2026 at 17:12):

alexcrichton closed issue #14336:

TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries

Details
Package	rustls
Version	0.23.37
URL	https://github.com/rustls/rustls/security/advisories/GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc
Date	2026-09-14
Patched versions	>=0.23.45
Unaffected versions	<0.23.13

Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level
when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. For example,
a plaintext EncryptedExtensions message packed into the same record as the
ServerHello was accepted.

RFC 8446 section 5.1 requires that handshake messages do not span key changes,
and that implementations terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message"
alert if they do.

The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker
cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that
a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext
without rustls rejecting the connection.

This is functionally the same bug as Go's
GO-2026-4340 (CVE-2025-61730).

See advisory page for additional details.

Last updated: Sep 20 2026 at 18:08 UTC